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THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE: WOULD ACTION BY CONGRESS PRECLUDE ADEQUATE
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AT THE STATE LEVEL?
S. Shane Stroud *
The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States and
localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce,
but it does not elevate free trade above all other values. As long as a State
does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to place itself in
a position of economic isolation, it retains broad regulatory authority to
protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural
resources. 1
INTRODUCTION
In May 2012, Canadian energy company TransCanada Corporation filed the
most recent of several applications with the United States Department of State (State
Department) to construct a cross-border crude oil pipeline from western Canada to
the oil refineries situated along the Gulf of Mexico. 2 If approved, the Keystone XL
pipeline would transport Canadian crude oil nearly seventeen hundred miles from
facilities north of Hardisty, Alberta to refineries in Texas, passing through Montana,
South Dakota, and Nebraska before joining an existing TransCanada pipeline just
north of Kansas’s border with Nebraska. 3 If completed, the Keystone XL pipeline
would have the largest capacity of any cross-border pipeline between Canada and
the United States. 4 However, the State Department has yet to approve the permits
necessary for TransCanada to begin construction of Keystone—a move some
*
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1
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
2
PAUL W. PARFOMAK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41668, KEYSTONE XL
PIPELINE PROJECT: KEY ISSUES 2–3 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41668.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4B3Y-JWFY.
3
See id. at 2–4.
4
See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42611, OIL SANDS AND
THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE: BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 22 tbl.
3 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42611.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/3XP9-XKD4.
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lawmakers perceive as an attempt by the Obama Administration to block the
project’s construction. 5
In response to this perceived inaction, the United States House of
Representatives, led by House Republicans, voted to approve a bill that would
authorize construction of the Keystone XL pipeline without State Department
approval in May 2013. 6 The genesis of the bill flowed primarily from congressional
frustration over the perceived lack of action by the Obama Administration, which
had failed to either approve or outright deny any of TransCanada’s many
construction permit applications during the previous five years for a pipeline project
many see as essential to America’s energy future. 7
But because the House bill approving Keystone XL is unlikely to pass the
Senate and has no chance of being signed into law by President Obama, 8 it is likely
dead on arrival and is best viewed as a message bill with the primary purpose of
expressing the House’s discontent with the President’s handling of the Keystone XL
pipeline. 9 Nevertheless, the very fact the Bill was proposed and passed by the House
raises unique questions specific to the cross-border pipeline permitting process.
Specifically, because Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to permit
the Keystone XL pipeline, 10 bypassing any “obstruction” on the part of the Obama

5

See Andrew Restuccia, House Passes Bill Approving Keystone Pipeline, POLITICO
(May 22, 2013, 8:15 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/house-passes-keystonepipeline-bill-91792.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UX3G-QEYQ.
6
Id.
7
See id.
8
See Stephen Dinan, Obama Administration Threatens Keystone Veto, WASH. TIMES
INSIDE POL. BLOG (May 21, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside
-politics/2013/may/21/obama-administration-threatens-keystone-veto/, archived at http://
perma.cc/J3QS-JDDE.
9
See Restuccia, supra note 5.
10
This Note proceeds under the assumption that Congress retains authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate cross-border projects that would substantially affect foreign
commerce, such as the Keystone XL pipeline project. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United
States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (noting that when Congress acts in matters of “international
relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade[,] the people of the United States
act through a single government with unified and adequate national power”). Whether the
President’s authority to regulate foreign affairs conflicts with Congress’s authority to
regulate foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause is beyond the scope of this Note.
However, several justices have acknowledged Congress’s authority to act without limitation
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority should it choose to do so, effectively recognizing
that Congress may remove the Executive’s ability to act unilaterally in approving crossborder commerce projects like Keystone XL. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 609
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing Congress’s authority to act pursuant to the
Commerce Clause as “plenary”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over
the matter.”). Accordingly, if Congress were to act to remove the State Department’s current
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Administration, would the so-called dormant Commerce Clause preclude or
substantially limit the ability of individual states to impose environmental
regulations that would affect the Keystone XL pipeline project?
This Note explores this issue and concludes that state environmental regulation
of the Keystone pipeline would likely pass judicial scrutiny so long as those
regulations were passed pursuant to a legitimate state interest. Part I explores the
history of the Keystone XL pipeline project and focuses on the current
environmental analysis of the project. Part II discusses the dormant Commerce
Clause’s background, how it has been applied in the context of state environmental
regulations, and how its application might affect future environmental regulations.
Finally, Part III looks at the proposed project through the lens of the dormant
Commerce Clause. It concludes that states concerned about the Keystone XL
pipeline’s ramifications can enact constitutional legislation to preserve their
environments even if doing so would burden interstate commerce.
I. THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE PROJECT
A. History of the Project
The Keystone XL pipeline proposal is not so much an original project as it is a
sizeable addition to an already extensive network of pipelines between
TransCanada’s Alberta-based crude oil extraction facilities and a larger heavily used
pipeline that runs through the heart of the American Midwest. 11 Notably, a large
portion of the network, of which Keystone XL would be part, already exists in the
form of a pipeline that runs east from Alberta to Saskatchewan; then drops south
across the international border; and finally runs through Montana, North and South
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma. 12 However, the proposed Keystone XL
extensions would shortcut the current pipeline route and allow a more direct link
between the crude resource in Canada and the refinery capabilities of the U.S. Gulf

ability to approve cross-border pipelines like the Keystone XL project, it is likely the Court
would find such an action to be a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause. See Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1163 (D. Minn. 2010)
(acknowledging Presidential authority to issue cross-border pipeline permits as
constitutional because “Congress has not attempted to exercise any exclusive authority over
the permitting process”); Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep't of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d
1071, 1081 (D.S.D. 2009) (noting that the President retains power to issue permits for crossborder pipeline projects because “Congress has failed to create a federal regulatory scheme
for the construction of oil pipelines”); Ryan Harrigan, Transcanada's Keystone XL Pipeline:
Politics, Environmental Harm, & Eminent Domain Abuse, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 207,
218 (2012) (noting the proposed Keystone XL pipeline “falls directly within Congress’
delegated power”).
11
PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 fig.2. For an excellent overview of the proposed
project, see Kurt Gasser, Note, The TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly Debate, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 489 (2012).
12
PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 fig. 2.

274

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

Coast. 13 If approved, these new sections would result in construction of
approximately fourteen hundred miles of new thirty-six-inch diameter pipe in the
United States at a cost of nearly seven billion dollars. 14
While TransCanada envisions the pipeline would initially carry approximately
seven hundred thousand barrels of crude oil per day, 15 the pipeline would be capable
of transporting as much as eight hundred and thirty thousand barrels per day if
changes in market conditions led to greater demand.16 Additionally, the Keystone
XL pipeline route would be designed to carry approximately one hundred thousand
barrels per day from oil resources located in Montana and North Dakota, as well as
one hundred and fifty thousand barrels of oil per day from Oklahoma’s oil fields. 17
All told, the project would represent a major expansion of North America’s crudeoil-transportation capabilities, keeping pace with the Gulf Coast region’s expanding
refining capabilities at a time when international crude imports are falling. 18
Proponents of the pipeline, such as Speaker of the House John Boehner, claim
Keystone XL’s construction “will create tens of thousands of American jobs and
pump nearly a million barrels of oil to U.S. refineries each day, helping to lower gas
prices, boost economic growth, enhance our energy security, and revitalize
manufacturing.” 19 Opponents argue the Keystone XL pipeline application was
inadequately reviewed for detrimental environmental impacts. 20 They argue that if
approved the Keystone XL pipeline will greatly contribute to climate change 21 and
13

BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L ENVTL. & SCI. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED
KEYSTONE XL PROJECT ES-1 to ES-4 (2011), available at http://keystonepipelinexl.state.gov/documents/organization/182010.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/83L6-BTBT
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT].
14
Id. at ES-2.
15
Id. at ES-1. A barrel of crude oil is equivalent to 42 gallons. Frequently Asked
Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=24&t=10,
archived at http://perma.cc/C44L-DT8W (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
16
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 13, at ES2.
17
Id. at ES-3.
18
Id. at ES-5 to ES-6. The region’s refining capability is projected to expand by
approximately 500,000 barrels per day over the next six years. Id. at ES-6. This is on par
with Keystone’s existing contracts to carry 535,000 barrels per day of Canadian and U.S.
crude oil should the project be completed. See id. at ES-5.
19
Press Release, Speaker Boehner’s Press Office, House Votes to Approve Keystone
Pipeline, Create Tens of Thousands of Jobs & Increase Energy Security (May 22, 2013),
available at http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/house-votes-approve-keystone-pipelinecreate-tens-thousands-jobs-increase-energy, archived at http://perma.cc/4FXL-TAQS.
20
See John H Cushman, Jr., EPA Deems U.S. State Department Keystone Review
‘Insufficient,’ GUARDIAN ENV’T NETWORK (Apr. 23, 2013, 10:49 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/apr/23/epa-keystone-green-groups, archived
at http://perma.cc/JEH2-HCHP.
21
Lucia Graves, State Department’s Keystone Analysis Ignores True Climate Impact:
Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2013, 2:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013
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increase the risk of oil spills in the United States and Canada.22 Both sides seem to
agree, however, that the debates over the costs and benefits of the Keystone XL
pipeline are not likely to end when the project is approved. And in particular,
questions over the environmental impacts of the pipeline are likely to be at issue
well into the foreseeable future.
B. Current Environmental Analysis of the Keystone XL Pipeline
If construction of Keystone XL goes forward, it will only be after the
appropriate “hard look” the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires of
all projects that involve action by a federal agency and that might “significantly
affect[] the quality of the human environment.” 23 Under NEPA, whenever a federal
agency takes an action that might significantly affect the human environment, the
federal agency must carefully consider the impact such actions will have on the
environment and inform the public as to the results of those findings. 24
Consideration of environmental impacts under NEPA takes place in two
general phases: the preparation of a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and
preparation of a final EIS. 25 First, when an agency completes a draft EIS, it must
make the EIS available for public comment and input from any “[c]ooperating
agency . . . which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact” associated with the project. 26 Then the “lead agency” in
charge of preparing the draft EIS reviews and often responds to comments from the
public and any cooperating agencies to aid in the completion of a final EIS. 27
In the case of the Keystone project, the “lead agency” has thus far been the
State Department, as permitting authority currently rests with the President. 28
Accordingly, once the State Department assembled the draft EIS for the project, it
released the draft to the public and submitted it to the Environmental Protection

/04/16/state-department-keystone-report_n_3092865.html, archived at http://perma.cc/X4P
D-48H7.
22
Keystone XL Pipeline, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, http://www.foe.org/projects/climate
-and-energy/tar-sands/keystone-xl-pipeline, archived at http://perma.cc/C3FF-QZGT (last
visited June 14, 2014).
23
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
24
PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 7–8. In addition, NEPA requires the federal
agency in charge of approving any project that might significantly affect the human
environment to consult with additional agencies—like the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
the U.S. National Park Service, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—depending on the
area that will be affected by the agency’s action and the jurisdictions of those agencies. Id.
at 14–15.
25
Id. at 7.
26
40 C.F.R. § 1508.5 (2014).
27
See id.§ 1508.16.
28
PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
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Agency (EPA), one of the cooperating agencies for the Keystone project as
implicated by NEPA. 29
After careful review of the State Department’s draft EIS, the EPA rated the
draft EIS as “[i]nadequate,” noting “potentially significant impacts were not
evaluated, that more information and analysis was needed, and [that] the draft EIS
would need revision and again be made available for public review.” 30 Thereafter,
the State Department issued a supplemental draft opinion that addressed the
concerns of the EPA, other federal agencies, and the public. 31
However, the EPA was skeptical of the supplemental draft; it acknowledged
that the State Department had “worked diligently” in addressing the shortcomings
of the original draft EIS, but the EPA found the supplemental draft contained
“[i]nsufficient [i]nformation.” 32 To address these shortcomings, the EPA
recommended the State Department more fully address the following:
potential oil spill risks, including additional analysis of other
reasonable alternatives to the proposed pipeline route; provide
additional analysis of potential oil spill impacts, health impacts, and
environmental justice concerns to communities along the pipeline
route and adjacent refineries; and improve its characterization of
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions associated with Canadian oil
sands crude. 33
Whether the State Department carefully considered the EPA’s admonitions is
unclear. 34
However, regardless of whether the State Department fully considered the
EPA’s suggestions, the State Department released a final EIS for the Keystone XL
pipeline in August of 2011. 35 Members of Congress immediately resisted the final
EIS. 36 Specifically, fourteen members of Congress wrote letters to the State
Department questioning its handling of the EIS preparations. 37 These
representatives were prompted to question the State Department, at least in part, by
new reports indicating the EIS had been prepared by an outside agency, which was
at the time in contact with the pipeline’s developer, TransCanada. 38 Likely as a result
of these contentions, the Inspector General’s Office initiated a probe into whether
the State Department had violated its duty as an unbiased decision maker when

29

Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 10 tbl.1.
31
Id. at 35–36.
32
Id. at 35.
33
Id. at 36.
34
See id.
35
Id. at 8.
36
Id. at 36.
37
Id.
38
Id.
30
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preparing the draft and final EISs. 39 And while the Inspector General’s Office
eventually found the State Department “did not violate its role as an unbiased
oversight agency,” 40 this was only the first of many questions concerning the
adequacy of the final EIS. 41
Specifically, after the final EIS was completed, it was submitted for public
comment. During the public comment phase, the final EIS received substantial
comments regarding concerns over whether the Keystone XL pipeline would be a
significant environmental hazard. 42 Among other worries, citizens voiced concerns
that the pipeline would be routed through environmentally sensitive areas in
Nebraska and the rest of the Ogallala Aquifer, which provides a significant quantity
of the Midwest’s water. 43 Concerned about the comments it received, the State
Department delayed approval of the pipeline until it could further address the
concerns raised by the EPA and other federal agencies and those concerns expressed
during the public comment period. 44
This time, the State Department’s decision was challenged by members of
Congress who were concerned that the Department’s delay was a reaction to
pressure from environmental groups and not a product of careful review of EIS
findings. 45 Thus, in December 2011, Congress passed legislation requiring the State
Department to approve or deny the pipeline within sixty days. 46 In January 2012, the
State Department, with the consent of President Obama, announced it would deny a
permit to TransCanada for the construction of the pipeline pending further
evaluation of the project. 47
This denial leaves the pipeline in a precarious position. At this point, well over
three years have passed since the State Department denied TransCanada a permit;
therefore, any further actions to approve the project may first need to be evaluated
through preparation of new EIS. 48 With the average EIS taking well over three years
to prepare, 49 any such requirement may in and of itself be the “kiss of death” for the
project. 50And importantly, further environmental impact studies might function to
stall construction of the pipeline even if Congress acts to directly approve the project
39

Id.
Id.
41
Id. at 36–38.
42
Id.
43
See id. at 37.
44
Id. at 37–38.
45
See Keystone XL: #TimeToBuild, ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM.: U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://energycommerce.house.gov/content/keystone-xl, archived at
http://perma.cc/RLH3-AMQG (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
46
Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-78, § 501,
125 Stat. 1280, 1289 (2011).
47
PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 38.
48
Id.
49
Piet deWitt & Carole A. deWitt, How Long Does It Take to Prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement?, 10 ENVTL. PRAC. 164, 164 (2008).
50
Cronin v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990).
40
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pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority, thus bypassing the State Department’s
current control over the pipeline’s future. 51
However, while the Keystone XL pipeline has already undergone significant
environmental study, it is unclear whether the studies are complete or if further
research will be conducted. While the Obama Administration seems to believe
further environmental study is needed, 52 a recent House Resolution authorizing
construction of the project unequivocally states that the current environmental
regulation and evaluation is sufficient to allow the project to progress. 53
Going forward, further environmental regulation or analysis of the proposed
pipeline may need to take place at the state level—not the national level. The
constitutionality of such regulation and analysis is the subject of the following
sections of this Note.
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The United States Constitution provides Congress with exclusive authority
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” 54 Over the course of the nation’s
history, this clause has been the source of wide-sweeping congressional action,
debate, and judicial scrutiny. 55 Nevertheless, the Commerce Clause still “represents
one of the broadest bases for the exercise of congressional authority” and continues
to play an important part in congressional legislation. 56 Indeed, should Congress act
51

Notably, the recent resolution passed by the U.S. House of Representatives explicitly
provides that the current State Department’s final EIS meets the statutory requirements of
NEPA. H.R. Res. 3, 113th Cong. (2013). However, whether this pronouncement by one part
of Congress is sufficient to actually ensure the EIS is in compliance with NEPA remains an
unanswered question.
52
See PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 38.
53
H.R. Res. 3, 113th Cong. (2013) (“The final environmental impact statement issued
by the Secretary of State on August 26, 2011, coupled with the Final Evaluation Report
described in the previous sentence, shall be considered to satisfy all requirements of
[NEPA] . . . .”).
54
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
55
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (holding Congress may regulate
a purely intrastate activity if such activity affects interstate commerce in any way because
the “Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal
and state law, federal law shall prevail”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942)
(upholding the right of Congress to pass an agricultural law that prohibited farmers from
growing wheat crops). But see Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586
(2012) (holding that while Congress enjoys broad power pursuant to the Commerce Clause,
it does not have the power under the Clause to compel market participation); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (noting that while Congress enjoys broad power under
the Commerce Clause, there must still be some “nexus” between the legislation passed
pursuant to the Clause and the activity the legislation seeks to regulate).
56
ADAM VANN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42124, PROPOSED KEYSTONE XL
PIPELINE: LEGAL ISSUES 13 (2012).
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to wrestle the authority to permit the Keystone XL pipeline away from the President,
it would almost certainly be pursuant to its own authority to regulate commerce with
the “foreign nation” of Canada.
In addition to providing Congress with the authority to regulate commerce,
according to the United States Supreme Court, the Commerce Clause mandates that
individual states are required to do the opposite in the face of congressional
legislation. 57 If a state passes a law that affects the flow of interstate commerce, that
law will be struck down if it “clearly discriminates against interstate
commerce . . . unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor
unrelated to economic protectionism.” 58
In modern application, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis takes two forms,
depending on whether a law overtly regulates out-of-state commercial interests and
is thus discriminatory “on its face.” First, if a challenged state statute is “facially
discriminatory”—if it discriminates between in-state commerce and out-of-state
commerce—the law will almost always be struck down as violating the dormant
Commerce Clause. 59 Second, if a law does not facially discriminate but nevertheless
has a discriminatory impact on interstate commerce, a court will carefully evaluate
the law to determine whether the law serves a legitimate state interest, such as public
health, safety, or environmental concerns. 60 If the statute serves a legitimate state
interest, the law will usually stand even if it incidentally burdens commerce. 61
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is replete with examples of laws ruled
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. 62 These cases seem to
support a conclusion that any state regulation affecting interstate commerce will be
struck down as invalid per se under the dormant Commerce Clause if the law
discriminates against out-of-state economic interests to the benefit of in-state
interests. 63 However, one case stands out as an exception to this general rule and
represents the type of precedent states might rely on to pass environmental
regulation if they are dissatisfied with the obviously disputed environmental findings

57

See id.
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
59
VANN ET AL., supra note 56, at 13.
60
Id. at 13–14.
61
See id.
62
See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
581–82 (1986) (holding New York state law that regulated only out-of-state liquor
transaction a violation of the Commerce Clause); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n,
432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (holding that a North Carolina law prohibiting the display of outof-state apple grade was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because the law
amounted to economic protectionism); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356
(1951) (holding a local zoning ordinance that regulated location of dairies unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause when those ordinances presented a substantial burden to
interstate commerce).
63
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)
(recognizing that a state law that places a discriminatory restriction on commerce will almost
always be found per se invalid).
58
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in the current Keystone project EIS.
This case, Maine v. Taylor, 64 represents a rare exception in the Court’s
otherwise uniform unwillingness to permit state laws that discriminate against outof-state economic interests. In Taylor, the Supreme Court considered a Maine law
that prohibited importation of baitfish for use in commercial fishing. 65 Taylor was
arrested in Maine for violating the law and later indicted as having violated a portion
of the federal Lacey Act, which provides criminal penalties should a person
“import . . . any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of
any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law.” 66 Taylor
demurred, alleging Maine’s law discriminated against out-of-state interests at the
expense of Maine’s in-state economic interest and was, therefore, unconstitutionally
burdensome to interstate commerce. 67
Maine subsequently intervened, arguing that the “ban legitimately protects . . .
[Maine] fisheries from parasites and nonnative species that might be included in
shipments of live [out-of-state] baitfish.” 68 A federal district court agreed with
Maine, holding the law passed constitutional scrutiny, but the First Circuit reversed,
“agreeing with Taylor that the underlying state statute impermissibly restricts
interstate trade.” 69 On appeal, the Supreme Court first noted the Commerce Clause
acts as a grant of congressional power to legislate and “that it . . . limits the power
of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade.” 70 Accordingly, if a state statute
“affirmatively discriminate[s]” against out-of-state commerce, the law will fall. 71
The law in question in Taylor explicitly targeted only those shipments of bait
originating from outside Maine, and thus the law facially discriminated between instate and out-of-state interests. But the Supreme Court nevertheless held that because
“Maine has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood
environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately prove to be
negligible,” it could not read “constitutional principles underlying the commerce
clause . . . as requiring the State of Maine to sit idly by and wait until potentially
irreversible environmental damage has occurred . . . .” 72 Ultimately, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of Maine’s law prohibiting the import of baitfish despite
the fact that it burdened out-of-state commerce because Maine had a legitimate
interest in preserving its “unique and unusually fragile” fisheries. 73
64

477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Id. at 132–33.
66
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (1981)).
67
Id. at 133.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 137 (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980)).
71
See id. at 138 (noting that in determining whether a statute violates the Commerce
Clause, the proper inquiry is whether the law only “incidentally” burdens commerce as
opposed to “affirmatively” discriminating against out-of-state economic transactions).
72
Id. at 148.
73
Id. at 150–51. Importantly, Taylor represents one of the few cases in which the Court
found that a law aimed directly at out-of-state activity did not impermissibly infringe on
65
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For several reasons, Taylor is an important milestone case for states who seek
to enact regulations to protect their environmental interests, even though such
regulations may burden interstate commerce. First, because the Court upheld
Maine’s law despite recognizing it discriminated against out-of-state commerce,
other states may be able to rely on Taylor in passing laws to protect their own
environmental interests regardless of the burden on interstate commerce. 74 Next,
because the Court upheld Maine’s law even though there were “impediments to
complete success,” other states might find their own environmental regulations that
provide only partial environmental protection withstand judicial scrutiny. 75 Finally,
Taylor stands for the proposition that although science may not agree on one
particular course of action, a state need not “sit idly by” while the scientific
community decides upon a particular solution, and may instead take affirmative
steps to protect its environment. 76
Taken together, these protective measures may prove particularly useful for
states concerned about the environmental impact the Keystone XL pipeline might
have on their state’s environments. Furthermore, going forward state legislation
addressing pipeline regulation may be necessary for states to ensure adequate
environmental protections should Congress approve the Keystone project.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE KEYSTONE XL
PIPELINE PROJECT
If Congress approves the Keystone XL pipeline in its current form, Congress
would likely attempt to meet the environmental requirements mandated by NEPA
by first accepting the State Department’s current “final” EIS. 77 For many states
along the Keystone XL pipeline’s proposed path, however, such a determination
may do little to alleviate fears concerning the environmental detriments that could

Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, thus withstanding the “strictest scrutiny” announced
in prior decisions concerning constitutionality of state environmental statutes in the context
of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 144 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)).
Thus, while strict scrutiny is generally fatal to facially discriminatory laws, Taylor stands for
the important proposition that laws aimed at legitimate environmental concerns may
withstand applications of even the strictest scrutiny, so long as those laws do not represent
pretextual or “arbitrary discrimination.” Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151–52.
74
It should be noted, however, that a state likely cannot enact a discriminatory
regulation to protect its environment if there are adequate nondiscriminatory measures that
can be taken to effect the same protections. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338
(1979) (holding Oklahoma statute that banned the export of local fish was unconstitutional
because it was effectively the “choice of the most discriminatory means even though
nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State’s purported legitimate
local purpose more effectively”).
75
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151.
76
Id. at 148.
77
See H.R. Res. 3, 113th Cong. (2013) (finding State Department’s final Keystone EIS
meets the procedural requirements of NEPA).
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flow from the construction and operation of the pipeline. For example, as noted in
Part I, concerns over fragile environments along the proposed route of the pipeline
and over Midwest water supplies found in large aquifers underlying the pipeline’s
route might spur states to enact environmental protection laws based on the potential
effects of the Keystone XL pipeline. 78 If they do, these laws are likely to place
environmental restrictions on the pipeline that the federal government has yet to
enact. Accordingly, these laws may be the types of “facially” discriminatory laws
that are “virtually per se” invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause.79
However, if states along the route of the proposed pipeline pass environmental
regulations in furtherance of legitimate state interests, these laws might stand as
constitutional because they would be instances of states protecting “against
imperfectly understood environmental risks,” even if those risks “ultimately prove
to be negligible.” 80 Part III explores how far a state might go in enacting such
legislation. Subpart A explores three cases—City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 81
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 82 and Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality of the State of Oregon 83—that provide insight into the types
of environmental regulations that may be permissible under the dormant Commerce
Clause. Subpart B then moves on to suggest several strategies for states wishing to
pass legislation to protect against the possible negative environmental ramifications
of the Keystone XL pipeline.
A. Economic Protectionism vs. Environmental Protection: Lessons from City
of Philadelphia, Hughes, and Oregon Waste Systems, Inc.
States seeking to protect their environments and natural resources from
Keystone’s potential negative impacts have multiple options at their disposal.
However, before states along the proposed route of the Keystone XL pipeline enact
environmental legislation, they should understand three cases that deal specifically
with environmental regulations that were not constitutional.
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court struck down a New
Jersey law that prohibited out-of-state waste disposal in New Jersey landfills. 84 The
Court held that because waste is an article of commerce, New Jersey’s ban on
importation violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 85 Writing for the majority,
Justice Stewart repeated the now-familiar rule that state regulations intended strictly

78

PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 36–37.
See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding state laws
enacted for purely protectionist reasons are generally always invalid); accord Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981).
80
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148.
81
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
82
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
83
511 U.S. 93 (1994).
84
437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
85
Id. at 628.
79
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for economic protectionism are per se invalid. 86 He was also careful to note,
however, that a state is free to pass laws to “safeguard the health and safety of its
people” even if those laws impose an incidental burden on interstate commerce. 87
Thus, if a law or regulation advances a legitimate public interest, that interest must
be weighed against the incidental burden that might be imposed on interstate
commerce. 88
A state law cannot do what New Jersey did in City of Philadelphia—ban an
import from another state simply to protect a state’s economic interests while
claiming the law exclusively to be environmental regulation. 89 Two important
lessons, therefore, emerge from City of Philadelphia. First, state environmental
regulations are permissible, even if they might incidentally burden interstate
commerce. 90 But second, if a state passes an environmental regulation to protect its
environment, the regulation must legitimately be for environmental protection and
not a ruse to halt an unpopular form of commerce. 91 In short, unless an
environmental regulation “can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local
concerns,” the regulation risks being struck down as an unconstitutional
“protectionist measure” under the principles laid out in City of Philadelphia. 92
Decided a year after City of Philadelphia, Hughes v. Oklahoma laid out a more
specific three-prong test that is still applied today in determining whether a state or
local regulation impermissibly infringes on commerce. 93 In Hughes, the Court
considered an Oklahoma statute that proscribed importation of foreign baitfish. 94
Appellant Hughes was indicted when he imported a shipment of baitfish procured
in Oklahoma into Texas in violation of the statute and subsequently appealed
contending the law unconstitutionally violated the commerce clause.95 In reviewing
the lower court’s reliance on prior precedent that generally permitted states broad
discretion in enacting laws affecting wildlife within their borders, the Court
overruled this precedent and held that the statute could not survive a commerce
clause attack. 96
Citing to its decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 97 the Court noted the correct
86

Id. at 623–24.
Id.
88
See id.; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding “[i]f
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree” and that “the
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will . . . depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities”).
89
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 625–26.
90
See id. at 623–24.
91
See id. at 625–26.
92
Id. at 624.
93
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
94
See id. at 323.
95
Id. at 324.
96
Id. at 324–25.
97
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
87
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inquiry into whether a statute impermissibly interferes with Congress’s power under
the Commerce Clause requires the court to determine:
(1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only
incidental effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against
interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether
the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether
alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without
discriminating against interstate commerce. 98
In applying the three-prong test derived from its decision in Pike, the Court
first noted that the statute at issue was designed to “overtly block[] the flow of
interstate commerce at [the] State’s borders” 99 and accordingly was facially
discriminatory such that the first prong of the test “by itself may be a fatal defect”
to the law at issue. 100 Nevertheless, the court moved on to find that—in addition to
failing the test’s first prong—the statute additionally failed to further a legitimate
state interest via the least-discriminatory means possible and was thus “repugnant to
the Commerce Clause.” 101 Accordingly, the Court’s holding in Hughes is both an
application and clarification of Pike, making clear that any state statute that burdens
interstate commerce must clear three high hurdles to be constitutionally
permissible. 102
98

Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the threeprong test announced in Hughes represented the first time the Court had announced a specific
means of inquiring as to the constitutionality of a statute as it relates to the Commerce Clause,
the test is essentially a distillation of the Court’s historical dormant Commerce Clause
inquiries. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”); Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) (“Evenhanded local regulation to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest is valid unless preempted by federal action . . . .”);
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945) (“Congress, in enacting legislation within
its constitutional authority over interstate commerce, will not be deemed to have intended to
strike down a state statute designed to protect the health and safety of the public unless its
purpose to do so is clearly manifested . . . .”).
99
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (second alteration in original) (quoting City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 337–38.
102
Arguably of greatest importance for any state that wishes to pass legislation to
mitigate the possible detrimental effects of the Keystone XL pipeline is the Court’s
announcement in Hughes that any facially discriminatory law “[a]t a minimum . . . invokes
the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 441 U.S. at 322. Thus, in addition to ensuring any future
state law would pass Hughes’s three-part test, a state should also consider whether any
facially discriminatory regulation would stand up under the extraordinarily heavy burden of
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Finally, in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Quality of the State of Oregon, the Supreme Court considered a case similar to City
of Philadelphia and struck down an Oregon law that imposed a surcharge on out-ofstate solid waste. 103 The law at issue imposed a $2.25 per ton charge on the
importation of waste from outside the state. 104 Oregon insisted the surcharge was
necessary to help the state recoup costs of disposing of out-of-state waste that it
would otherwise have collected in the form of taxes or municipal fees. 105 However,
the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that because the fee applied only to imported
waste, it could not stand unless Oregon could show it advanced a local interest that
could not be advanced in a non-discriminatory alternative manner. 106 Because
Oregon was unable to show this was the case, the Supreme Court struck down the
surcharge as unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. 107
Like the Court’s prior decision in City of Philadelphia and Hughes, Oregon
Waste Systems also provides a valuable lesson for states wishing to pass legislation
to protect their environment from the possible negative impacts of the Keystone XL
pipeline. Namely, if a state wishes to pass environmental regulations that burden
interstate commerce, it must ensure that no alternative methods are available that
would lessen that burden. 108 As explained below, states along the route of the
Keystone XL pipeline should apply the lessons from all three of these cases to ensure
they can pass laws that provide adequate environmental protections and that will not
risk being struck down as unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.
B. Guidelines for Future State Environmental Laws
If states along Keystone XL’s proposed route believe they must act to protect
their environments, they must do so carefully to avoid having their laws struck down
as unconstitutional. With careful planning, however, states like Montana, South
Dakota, and Nebraska can ensure their laws provide heightened protection against
possible negative environmental impacts from the pipeline. There are several
effective and constitutional ways for states to ensure the survival of their laws.
First, states concerned about their citizens’ welfare should work to ensure
future environmental studies are based on objective science and well-accepted health
and safety criteria. 109 By using unbiased application of objective criteria in assessing
strict scrutiny.
103
See 511 U.S. 93, 95–98 (1994).
104
Id. at 99.
105
See id. at 100.
106
Id. at 100–01.
107
Id. at 108.
108
Id. at 100–01. Importantly, because the Court has indicated the “health and safety”
of a state’s citizenry are legitimate interests, if a state can show the regulation is necessary
to advance either of these interests, the regulation may have an increased chance of passing
constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause. See id.
109
See Justin M. Nesbit, Note, Commerce Clause Implications of Massachusetts’
Attempt to Limit the Importation of “Dirty” Power in the Looming Competitive Retail Market
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environmental impacts, a state law has a better chance of applying equally to in-state
and out-of-state market participants and avoiding the types of facially discriminatory
regulations that will almost always doom a law to failure. Thus, in the case of the
Keystone XL pipeline, laws that are premised on objective criteria, but that also
happen to incidentally burden interstate commerce to a greater extent than local
projects, would be less likely to be found unconstitutional.
Along these same lines, passing laws that apply generally to all petroleum
pipelines may permit a state to regulate Keystone XL specifically while avoiding the
types of facially discriminatory laws that would be found unconstitutional. 110 As the
Supreme Court said, “[i]t is not necessary to look beyond the text of [the] statute to
determine that it discriminates against interstate commerce.” 111 Thus, any law that
expressly distinguishes between in-state and out-of-state pipelines would almost
certainly be suspected of creating the type of “economic isolationism” the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has repeatedly held unconstitutional. 112
Conversely, laws that apply equally to both intra- and inter-state pipelines avoid the
“virtually per se rule of invalidity” reserved for facially discriminatory legislation,
even though the law may disproportionately impact foreign commerce. 113
for Electricity Generation, 38 B.C. L. REV. 811, 848–49 (1997) (suggesting laws passed
pursuant to objective health and safety data are more likely to pass constitutional muster,
even if they incidentally place greater burdens on foreign commerce); see also Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981) (noting a regulation that promoted
legitimate state interests in “conservation of energy and other natural resources” was not a
violation of the Commerce Clause when studies showed the regulation was the least
discriminatory means to bring about the desired environmental effects).
110
See Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 95 DICK. L.
REV. 131, 143 (1990).
111
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575–76
(1997).
112
Id. at 578–79.
113
Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Importantly, a court examining these laws through
the lens of the dormant Commerce Clause would likely find such regulations do not rise to
the level of unconstitutionality so long as they advance a legitimate environmental interest.
Thus, a state’s decision to incentivize or discourage industry activity by enacting pipeline
regulation that disproportionately affects the Keystone XL pipeline would not automatically
violate the dormant Commerce Clause. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730
F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] regulation is not facially discriminatory simply
because it affects in-state and out-of-state interests unequally.”). Instead, a state regulation
that disproportionately affects the Keystone XL pipeline would likely stand so long as the
regulation did not force the owners of the pipeline to enact a particular regulatory standard
and only incentivized industry practices equally applicable to all market participants. See id.
at 1101–04 (finding a California law did not regulate “extraterritorial conduct” when it
incentivized the use of certain in-state fuels over out-of-state fuels because the law did not
mandate that out of state participants adopt a particular regulatory standard). Further, in the
interim the administrative and legal burdens imposed by fighting the constitutionality of a
state law might prove to be so detrimental to TransCanada’s business interests that it chooses
to comply with stricter environmental regulations for the sake of avoiding costly construction
delays. C.f. VANN ET AL., supra note 56, at 16 (discussing the potential impact of legal and
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Nevertheless, if the enacted regulation was purported to apply to both in-state
and out-of-state oil pipelines, but instead affected only the Keystone XL pipeline, a
court could find the burdens outweigh the benefits and strike the regulation down. 114
Thus, if a state does decide to use this strategy to pass a law, the putative local
benefits of the regulation, such as health and safety, would still need to outweigh
any burdens on interstate commerce the regulation would impose and be
unachievable through alternative nondiscriminatory means. 115 Such a high bar may
make passage of any law regulating the Keystone XL pipeline easier to propose than
to pass.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while a state may not be able to pass a
regulation that interferes with interstate commerce, Congress has no authority to
force a state to enter the marketplace to advance commerce.116 This may prove to be
a big bargaining chip for a state like Montana, which stands to gain substantially if
it can route billions of barrels of Montana crude oil through the Keystone XL
pipeline. 117 For example, if Montana was overly concerned about Keystone XL’s
environmental impact on Montana, it could abstain from allowing oil leases on its
state lands, thereby limiting the flow of oil to the Keystone project.118 In doing so, it
could effectively force TransCanada to accept environmental regulation or run the
risk of having substantially less oil in its pipeline.119
administrative burdens on the expense and viability of the Keystone XL pipeline).
114
Nevertheless, the fact that a regulation discriminates only against out of state
commerce is insufficient in and of itself to establish a violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089–90. Instead, a regulation that
discriminated against the Keystone XL pipeline would be found to violate the Commerce
Clause only if a state failed to show such discrimination was only incidental to the regulation
in question and served a legitimate purpose that was not achievable through other nondiscriminatory means. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
115
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). It should be noted that the
Supreme Court has not held that nondiscriminatory means are present simply when a
nonregulatory alternative is available. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 603
n.3 (1997). Instead, a state could choose either to enact an environmental regulation or to
subsidize in-state production to essentially price foreign commerce out of the market. Id.
Thus, under the Court’s historic dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a state appears to
have discretion to enact either a market-based or regulatory-based incentive (or, presumably,
a combination of the two). Id.
116
See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586–91 (2012).
117
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 13, at
ES-3 (noting that the Keystone XL project linking to Montana would allow transport of
100,000 barrels per day of crude oil).
118
C.f. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978) (noting that
the Court expresses “no opinion about New Jersey’s power, consistent with the Commerce
Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state-owned resources”).
119
TransCanada’s current proposal anticipates significant inputs of up to two hundred
and fifty thousand barrels of U.S. crude oil per day from projects in Montana, North Dakota,
and Oklahoma. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note
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CONCLUSION
Presently, the Keystone XL pipeline—and its potential impacts on the
environment—is in limbo. President Obama, the State Department, and the EPA all
believe more study is needed on the potential environmental impacts of the pipeline
before it can be approved. On the other hand, many in the House of Representatives,
business, and industry believe the boost Keystone XL would provide to the U.S’s
economy, job creation, and energy independence eclipses any residual benefits
further environmental study might yield.
While it appears unlikely Congress will be able to approve the pipeline
pursuant to its authority to regulate foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause
anytime soon, if it could do so in the future, states concerned about the possible
environmental ramifications of the project might be forced to take action at the state
level in order to protect their environments. To do this, states must be sure to not
discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce in order to avoid violating the
dormant Commerce Clause.
But while the dormant Commerce Clause presents obstacles to state
environmental regulation, it need not block effective state regulation of
environmental quality. Through objective assessment, nondiscriminatory legislation,
careful planning for the use of state resources, and adherence to prior dormant
Commerce Clause precedent, states concerned about the Keystone XL pipeline can
ensure adequate environmental protection, even if the Federal Government fails to
do so.

13, at ES-3.

